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CASENOTE

ROWE V. STATE BANK OF LOMBARD*: THE KEY
TO UNLOCKING A LANDLORD'S DUTY TO
PROVIDE SECURITY
The modern trend in landlord and tenant law is toward holding
a landlord liable for the intentional criminal act of a third party.'
This trend represents a drastic change from the common law.2 Until
125 II. 2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988).
1. For a discussion of the landlord's liability in various states, see Lesar, Tort
Liability of Illinois Landlords for Crimes of Third Persons, 1983 S. ILL. L. REV. 415
(Illinois); Moore, The Landlord's Liability to His Tenants for Injuries Criminally
Inflicted by Third Persons, 17 AKRON L. REV. 395 (1984); O'Donnel, Landlord Liability for Crime to Florida Tenants-The New Duty to Protect From Foreseeable Attack, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 979 (1984) (Florida); Wilcox, A Lawyer's Guide to the
South Carolina Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 39 S.C.L. REv. 493 (1988)
(South Carolina); Note, Landlord Liability for the Criminal Acts of Third Parties:
Recent Developments in Conecticut, 14 CONN. L. REV. 843 (1982) (Connecticut);
Comment, Landlord Liability for Criminal Acts Perpetrated Against Tenants: The
Pennsylvania Approach, 91 DICK. L. REV. 779 (1986) (Pennsylvania); Note, "Warranty of Security" in New York: A Landlord's Duty to Provide Security Precautions
in Residential Buildings Under the Implied Warranty of Habitability,16 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 487 (1987/88) (New York); Note, Landlord Liability for Criminal Acts on
Residential Premises: What Future for Tennessee, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 724 (1980)
(Tennessee); Note, CaliforniaLandlords' Duty to Protect Tenants From Criminals,
20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 859 (1983) (California); Note, Landlord And Tenant-Application of Implied Warranty of Habitability Expanded to Encompass
Tenant Security, 11 SETON HALL 576 (1981) (New Jersey); Note, Landlord and Tenant-Landlord Has Duty to Employ Reasonable Security Measures to Avoid Foreseeable Criminal Attacks on Tenants, 8 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 735 (1985) (Arkansas); Note, Landlord Liability for Crimes Committed by Third Parties Against
Tenants, 21 U. RIcH. L. REV. 181 (1986) (Virginia). But see Reskin, Landlord Need
Not Protect Tenants From Criminals, 71 A.B.A. J. 114 (April 1985). For a listing of
*

the jurisdictions that have adopted a common law duty upon landlords to protect
against the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties, see infra note 45.
2. The common law rule was that an intentional criminal act was a superseding
intervening cause which cut off any liability for the negligent actor. See, e.g., Ney v.
Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 79-80, 117 N.E.2d 74, 78 (1954) (thief took cab and
crashed into parked car after engine left running). See also Davis v. Thornton, 384
Mich. 138, 180 N.W.2d 11 (1970) (minors took car when keys were left in ignition and
injured plaintiff). In Ney, the defendant's cab was stolen when he left it parked on
the street with the engine running. The stolen cab collided with the plaintiff's car.
Ney, 2 Ill. 2d at 76, 117 N.E.2d at 76. The court recognized that the common law rule
was innappropriate and decided that a negligent actor is still liable for harm caused
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modern times, a landlord owed no general duty to the tenant. In
instances where there was a duty, the negligent actor was released
from liability when the resulting harm was caused by a superseding
intervening force, such as a third party's criminal act.3 In Rowe v.
Lombard State Bank, the Illinois Supreme Court considered
whether a commercial landlord" was liable for an intruder's violent
attack upon the tenant's employees when the landlord knew that
the door locks were not preventing intruders from entering the
premises.5 In finding for the tenant's employees, the court held that
landlords have a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent a known
risk of foreseeable harm. s The court's holding extended to commercial landlords a duty which Illinois courts had only previously imposed on residential landlords.7 Unfortunately, however, the court
limited the landlord's duty by requiring plaintiffs to prove that the
by the criminal act of a third party if the criminal act is reasonably foreseeable. Id. at
80, 117 N.E.2d at 78.
3. One of the most litigated issues in American law is the connection between
the negligent act and the resulting injury. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS §43 (5th ed. 1984). The actor is responsible for the foreseeable result of his act.
Id. This presents an even greater problem because:
[i]n one sense, almost nothing is entirely unforeseeable, since there is a very
slight mathematical chance, recognizable in advance, that even the most freakish accident which is possible will occur, particularly if it has ever happened in
history before. In another, no event whatever is entirely foreseeable, since the
exact details of a sequence never can be predicted with complete omniscience
and accuracy.
Id. at 297. To settle the problem the law has established a proximate cause rule. Id.
at 298.
A different problem results when the actual harm is caused by a force other than
that initiated by the negligent actor. These forces are called superseding, or intervening, causes. Id. at 301. An intervening cause is one which comes about after the negligent act. Id. It must come in between the negligent act of the actor and the resulting
harm, shifting the responsibility for the harm to the intervening act. Id. If the actual
harm is caused by an intervening cause, the negligent actor is absolved from liability.
Id. at 302. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §448 (1965) (imposes liability
only when intervening cause foreseeable). An exception, however, exists when the intervening cause was specifically foreseeable. W. KEETON, supra, at 303. An exception
also exists when the negligent act created the opportunity for the intervening cause.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §448 (1965).
4. Most of the decisions regarding a landlord's liability to tenants for crime on
the property have concerned residential property. Many commentators feel that commercial property should not be treated similarly. See Annotation, Landlord's Obligation to Protect Tenant Against Criminal Activities of Third Persons, 43 A.L.R. 3d
331, 339 (1972) (argument may be made landlord of residential property owes a
greater duty).
5. Rowe v. Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988).
6. Id. at 223, 531 N.E.2d at 1368.
7. See Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App. 3d 88, 497 N.E.2d 433 (1st Dist. 1986),
appeal denied, 113 Ill. 2d 571, 505 N.E.2d 352 (1986). See also Stribling v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 34 Ill. App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47 (1st Dist. 1975) (landlord who
knew of past burglaries liable for not securing point of burglars entrance); Trice v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1st Dist. 1973) (landlord not liable for television thrown from window).
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landlord actually knew of the risk.'
The Rowe case revolved around a lease of office space in a
multi-office complex. The builder" of the complex had incorporated
a master key system 0 which allowed him to issue individual keys to
each door, while retaining master keys"1 to all of the doors in the
complex. Apparently,"2 the builder did not properly control18 the

master keys,' and the lease between the landlord and the tenant
prohibited the tenant from installing additional security devices

without the consent of the landlord.1 6 The builder subsequently sold
the complex to Paramount Group, Inc. 6
After the sale to Paramount, a maintenance engineer warned
Fennessey, Paramount's managing agent, of the possibility of out8. For a discussion of the extent of a landlord's duty resulting from this decision, see infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
9. Leland Stahelin developed and operated the office park for some time before
selling it to Paramount. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 210, 531 N.E.2d at 1361. Stahelin was an
original defendant to this action. Id. at 208-09, 531 ,N.E.2d at 1360. The trial court
granted summary judgment in Stahelin's favor because he did not own or manage the
office park at the time of Free's attack. Id. at 211, 531 N.E.2d at 1362. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that Paramount's notice of the defects existing on the property
relieved Stahelin of liability and that the summary judgment in his favor was properly granted. Id. at 229, 531 N.E.2d at 1370. This casenote is concerned with the
trend developing liability of landlords for the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties; therefore, a full discussion of the propriety of releasing Stahelin is beyond the
scope of this discussion.
10. The landlord could re-key an individual door, or several different doors, as
often as he liked, without affecting the master keys. See id. at 210, 531 N.E.2d at
1361. To re-key the lock, the lock core was removed and replaced with a new core. Id.
The new core required a new key for that core, but the system's grandmaster keys
and master keys would still unlock the new core and thereby open the door. Id.
11. The system allowed for the existence of two levels of master keys. Id.
"Grandmaster" keys would open virtually all of the doors in the complex, while
"master" keys would open the doors to a particular building. Id. For purposes of this
article, the term master key shall include both types.
12. A maintenance man, Robert Davis, testified that the builder had not maintained control over the keys. Id. For the purposes of the summary judgment, the
court was required to accept all facts well-pleaded as true. Id. at 214, 531 N.E.2d at
1363. However, irrespective of the procedural requirement, the court seemed to accept the allegation as factual. See id. at 223, 531 N.E.2d at 1368 (failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent unauthorized access).
13. Davis had told Stahelin, the developer and prior owner, that he thought
that there were master keys missing. Id. at 210, 531 N.E.2d at 1361. Stahelin instructed Davis to order the replacement materials to change the locks in the complex.
Id. After the materials arrived, Stahelin changed his mind and told Davis not to install the new locks. Id. at 211, 531 N.E.2d at 1362. When Stahelin sold the complex to
Paramount, Stahelin took the lock replacement material. Id.
14. Davis said that he saw Free with master keys in 1972 or 1973. Brief for
Appellee at 7, Rowe v. Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988)
(No. 65167). At that time Free worked for Stahelin at the complex. Id.
15. Brief for Appellant at appendix p.20, Rowe v. Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill.
2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988) (No. 65167). Additionally, the lease prohibited the
tenant from making copies of the office keys. Id. Any additional keys required were to
be furnished by the landlord. Id.
16. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 207, 531 N.E.2d at 1360.
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standing master keys. 17 During the next two years the police investigated several crimes' s at the office park and advised Paramount to
change the locks."' However, due to the cost, Paramount decided not
to change the lock system.20
On the evening of April 23, 1978, a tenant saw James Free inside the complex after Free had apparently gained entry by using an
outstanding master key.2" The tenant called the landlord but the
landlord did not find Free on the complex. 2 At about 4 a.m. the
next morning Free entered the locked 22 offices leased by J-Mar and
shot two of J-Mar's employees, Bonnie Serpico and Lori Rowe, while
attempting to rape them.2"
17. The record does not indicate a basis for Davis' opinion that there were
master keys outstanding. In his deposition, Davis admitted that he was not responsible for the master keys. Brief for Appellee at 5, Rowe v. Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill.
2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988) (No. 65167).
18. Most of the crimes that the police investigated were minor and either occurred in the parking lot or in public areas of the buildings. Brief for Appellee at 911, Rowe v. Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988) (No. 65167).
None involved violence or Building #1, the building where J-Mar's office was located.
Id. Of the crimes reported, eight were burglaries. Id. Of these, the police could not
find signs of forced entry in five out of the eight. Id. The items taken during these
burglaries were twenty dollars in cash, a jacket, a calculator, and twenty five dollars
worth of postage from an office postage machine. Id. The postage theft was during
the course of two burglaries on consecutive nights. Id. In the postage burglaries the
police report indicated that the employees were the best suspects. Id. In another incident, the master key would not open the door to the office. Id. In the fourth, a coworker or janitor was suspected. Id. Finally, the door locks were inoperative at the
scene of the fifth burglary. Id.
19. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 211, 531 N.E.2d at 1362. Although the police suggested
changing the "locks," it was the lock system that created the risk. It is uncertain
whether either the police or Paramount recognized this. The police may have been
suggesting that individual locks be changed, or Paramount could have interpreted
their suggestion as such. The court apparently decided that the police intended to
refer to the lock system and that Paramount understood that. See id. (detective advised "the locks on the buildings ... should be changed").
20. The cost of changing all of the locks in the complex was estimated at
$2,500.00. Id.
21. A witness testified that she saw James Free standing inside a door in building #4. Id. at 212, 531 N.E.2d at 1362. The witness stated that she had previously
used her own key to open the building door and the door automatically locked behind
her. Id. The witness added that when she saw Free just inside the doorway, he had
keys in his hand. Id. The implication is that Free was in possession of a master key.
22. When Free was seen inside the building, Free told the occupants that he
was there to clean the carpets. Id. at 211, 531 N.E.2d at 1362. The occupants called
Fennessey, who came to the building; however, Fennessey was unable to locate Free
on the premises. Id. It is not known whether Free hid himself on the property from
that point until the attack, or if he left and came back later.
23. Rowe testified that the door Free came in was commonly left unlocked and
was often left propped open for ventilation. Brief for Appellee at 1, Rowe v. Lombard
State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988) (No. 65167). Rowe said that earlier on the night of the attack the door had been left open, but that at the time of the
attack it had been locked. Brief for Appellee at 11, Rowe v. Lombard State Bank, 125
Ill.2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988) (No. 65167).
24. People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 447 N.E.2d 218 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
865 (1983). On April 24, 1978, shortly before 4 a.m., Lori Rowe looked up from her
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Ms. Rowe, and Ms. Serpico's husband and minor children
brought an action against the landlord2 5 alleging that the landlord
breached a duty2" to protect them from the acts of Free. The trial
court found that the landlord did not have a duty27 to the tenant,
and granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants.2 8 The apdesk and saw James Free standing inside the door, holding a gun and carrying a cloth
bag in his hands. Id. at 388, 447 N.E.2d at 223. Free forced Rowe and Serpico into the
lunchroom and told them to take off their clothes because he wanted to rape them.
Id. at 389, 447 N.E.2d at 223. Free tied Rowe with twine he had brought in the cloth
bag, then led Serpico into another room. Id. While Free and Serpico were out of the
room, Rowe began to struggle out of her bonds. Id. When Free came back to check on
Rowe, Free saw that she had loosened the rope. Id. While Free was attending to
Rowe, Serpico got up from the other room and ran. Id. Free ran after Serpico and
shot her. Id. Free then returned to the room where Rowe lay tied, and shot her while
she was tied on the floor. Id. Free then fled. Id. Rowe recovered from her wound, but
Serpico died. Id.
Free was arrested the next morning. Id. at 390, 447 N.E.2d at 223. Pursuant to a
search warrant, the police found the cloth bag, the twine and the gun. Id. at 393-94,
531 N.E.2d at 225. The police searched for a key to the Office Park but did not find
one. Telephone interview with Walter P. Maksym, attorney for Lori Rowe, et al.
(February 22, 1989).
Free was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and attempted rape, and sentenced to death. Free, 94 Ill. 2d at 387, 447 N.E.2d at 222. Free has exhausted his
appeals to the Illinois Supreme Court and filed a writ of habeus corpus in the federal
court on March 27, 1989. Telephone interview with Kenneth Fedinets, Illinois Attorney General's Office (August 24, 1989). The matter is now pending before Judge
Aspen in the Northern District of Illinois. Id.
25. The original defendants in this case were James Free, J-Mar, Leland Stahelin, Paramount, Todd Fennessey and the Lombard State Bank. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at
207, 531 N.E.2d at 1361. The bank was dismissed because, as trustee, it held only
legal title to the property and was not otherwise involved. Id. at 211, 531 N.E.2d at
1362. J-Mar is not involved in this appeal, but was dismissed after the settlement of a
workman's compensation claim. Telephone conversation with Walter P. Maksym, attorney for Lori Rowe, et. al. (February 22, 1989). James Free did not cooperate in the
lawsuit and was found liable in abstentia. Id.
26. For examples of theories imposing a duty upon landlords to protect against
crime, see infra note 52 and accompanying text.
27. In general, whether there is a duty to another person is a question of law to
be decided by the court. See generally W. KEETON, supra note 3, at 236. Whether the
duty was breached is a question to be decided by the trier of fact. See id.
28. The original motion for summary judgment was denied. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at
211, 531 N.E.2d at 1362. After a change of judges for administrative reasons, the
defendants submitted a second motion for summary judgment, which was granted.
Id. at 213, 531 N.E.2d at 1363. The plaintiffs first argument, citing Balciunas v. Duff,
94 Ill. 2d 176, 446 N.E.2d 242 (1983), was that the trial court judge erred in granting
the summary judgment because it reversed an interlocutory order of another judge.
Id. at 213, 531 N.E.2d at 1363.
In Balciunas, the defendants filed a written motion for a protective order, but
the motion was denied. Balciunas, 94 Ill. 2d at 180, 446 N.E.2d at 244. After an administrative rotation of judges, the protective order sought by the defendants was
granted. Id. at 182, 446 N.E.2d at 245. The court decided that a successor judge
should only revise or modify previous rulings if there is a change of circumstances or
if there are additional facts which warrant the action. Id. at 188, 446 N.E.2d at 247.
The Rowe court reiterated its disapproval of a judge reviewing interlocutory orders entered by another judge where there is evidence of bad faith or judge shopping,
but found no such evidence in this case. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 214, 531 N.E.2d at 1363.
See also People ex rel. Phillips Co. v. Gitchoff, 65 Ill. 2d 249, 357 N.E.2d 534 (1976)
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pellate court affirmed, finding that the attack was unforeseeable because there were no previous violent crimes at the complex. 29' Therefore, the appellate court opined, the extent of the injuries was
unforeseeables ° even if the landlord was not in control of all the
master keys."1
The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in order to
determine whether the lower courts properly applied Illinois law in
granting and affirming the summary judgment.3 2 The court first considered whether the landlord had a general duty"3 to prevent the
attack 4 based on either a "special relationship"' 6 or through a gen(railroad explosion cases filed in different jurisdictions); People ex rel. Kelly, Ketting,
Furth, Inc. v. Epstein, 61 Ill. 2d 229, 335 N.E.2d 430 (1974) (defendant lost writ of
mandamus motion and sought order from different judge instead of appealing); People ex rel. East Side Levee & Sanitary District v. Madison County Levee & Sanitary
District, 54 Ill.
2d 442, 298 N.E.2d 177 (1973) (court should have declined action since
it was pending in another court).
29. Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 153 Ill.
App. 3d 788, 796, 505 N.E.2d 1380,
1386 (1987), rev'd, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988).
30. In Rowe, the issue was: At the time Paramount became aware that there
might be master keys unaccounted for, was it foreseeable (probable) that if Paramount did not take some action to prevent it, someone would be killed? The appellate court answered the question negatively, holding that the murder was unforeseeable. Rowe, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 797, 505 N.E.2d at 1389. Since foreseeability is a jury
question, the appellate court's holding encompassed the belief that no reasonable person could foresee that a death would result. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed.
Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 226, 531 N.E.2d at 1369.
31. Rowe, 153 Ill.
App. 3d at 797, 505 N.E.2d at 1387.
32. For a discussion on the court's analysis of the summary judgment issue, see
supra note 28.
33. At common law a tenant received only a right to possession of the property
he leased. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 76 (2d ed.
1988). The landlord made no other commitments. Id. Modern courts and legislatures
have recognized that the lease of an apartment in a high rise building in a city should
not be treated the same as a long term lease of a farm. Id. Because of the changes in
the types of leases, the courts and legislatures created a promise, implicit in most
leases, that the premises are fit and habitable. Id. at 77. See also Glendon, The
Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C.L. REV. 503 (1982) (discussion of implied warranty of habitability). The implied warranty of habitability
covers the physical condition of the premises and all "facilities vital to the use of the
premises for residential purposes." Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436
(1980). The warranty includes sufficient heat, ventilation, light, plumbing, sanitation,
security and maintenance for the building to be habitable. Id. at 219, 412 A.2d at 442.
An issue which the Rowe court saw no need to discuss was whether the implied
warranty of habitability applies to a particular lease. Most jurisdictions give broad
scope to the warranty, applying it to all dwellings, whether multiple or single family.
C. MOYNIHAN, supra, at 78. See also CUNNINGHAM, STOEBUCK AND WHITMAN, THE LAW
OF PROPERTY §6.38 (1984) (discussion of implied warranty of habitability). The warranty has not been extended beyond residential leases. Cf. C. MOYNIHAN, supra, at 78
(commercial property excluded from discussion of implied warranty of habitability).
34. The court made no distinction between tenants and people on the premises
with the tenants' consent, such as employees of a tenant, or business invitees of a
tenant. Rowe, 125 Ill.
2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358. Illinois law suggests this result. See
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80,
302 (Smith-Hurd 1987).
35. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the special
relationship exception.
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eral foreseeability rule.36 Finding no such general duty, the court
considered whether Paramount had assumed a duty through a voluntarily undertaken action; providing a security system, retaining
control over a portion of the property or maintaining control over
the master keys. 7 The court found that while a voluntary undertaking can create a duty, if such a duty was created in this case, the
landlord did not breach it.3 8 The court decided the case by holding
that when knowledge of foreseeable harm is combined with the
landlord's sole ability to guard against it, without undue burden, the
landlord has the duty to take reasonable steps to guard against that
harm. 9 The court concluded by finding that the criminal act of a
third party is not a superseding cause4 which cuts off liability if the
landlord's negligence" facilitates the criminal act. 2'
In its analysis, the court first noted the general rule that a landlord is not an insurer of the tenants' safety ' and is not liable for the
harm which a third party's criminal act causes to tenants. Although
noting that an exception to this general rule exists when there is a
36. See infra note 45 (duty arising from foreseeability).
37. See infra note 54 (duty arising from a voluntary undertaking).
38. Rowe, 125 Il. 2d at 221, 531 N.E.2d at 1367.
39.
40.

Id. at 223, 531 N.E.2d at 1367-68.
Courts have historically been reluctant to impose a duty to protect others
from crime. J. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY (2d ed. 1988). See also RE-

OF TORTS §314 (1965) (no general duty to act for the protection
of others). This stems from the concept that under ordinary and normal circumstances, one may expect others to obey the criminal law. W. KEETON, supra note 3, at
200. This expectation does not apply where crime is known, or should be known, to
be imminent. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §448 (1965) (intentionally tortious or criminal acts done under opportunity afforded by actor's negligence).
If an actor increases the risk of harm, even if the harm is the result of a criminal act
of a third party, the actor may be liable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §302A
(1965).
Additionally, where the duty is directly related to protecting against the criminal
act of a third party, the criminal act of the third party would not be a superseding
intervening cause. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §449 (1965).
41. "The best definition of negligence is the faillure [sic] to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." 65 C.J.S. Negligence §1(2) (1966). Negligence alone is not actionable. W. KEETON, supra note 3, at § 30. A cause of action in negligence requires 1) a legal duty; 2)
STATEMENT (SECOND)

a breach of that duty; 3) an injury to another; and 4) a reasonably close causal con-

nection between the breach of the duty and the injury. Id.
42. Rowe v. Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 224, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1368
(1988).
43. A number of jurisdictions have expanded the implied warranty of habitability to include security, and therefore, to a degree the' landlords are insurers of tenants' safety. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439
F.2d 477 (D.C. App. 1970); Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 503 F. Supp.
1157 (D. Kansas 1980) (applying Kansas law); Holley v. Mount Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J.
214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980); Brownstein v. Edison, 103 Misc. 2d 316, 425 N.Y.S.2d 773
(1980). But see Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App. 3d 88, 497 N.E.2d 433 (1986), appeal denied, 113 Ill. 2d 571, 505 N.E.2d 352 (1986).
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special relationship between the parties, the court found that no Illinois court has found that a simple4' landlord and tenant relationship is such a special relationship. While the court recognized that a'
number of jurisdictions' have adopted a general duty"6 based
strictly 47 upon the foreseeability 48 of harm, the court declined to ex-

44. The Rowe court used the phrase "simple relationship between the landlord
and tenant" in referring to the special relationship exception. Rowe, 125 Il1. 2d at 216,
531 N.E.2d at 1364. This is not an accurate depiction of the modern relationships.
For a discussion of the differences between modern leases and historical leases, see
infra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
45. Several jurisdictions currently recognize some form of the foreseeability
rule, which imposes upon a landlord the duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent harm to his tenants when that harm is foreseeable. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave.
Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. App. 1970); Jackson v. Warner Holdings, Ltd.,
617 F. Supp. 646 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (applying Arkansas law); Isaacs v. Huntington
Mem. Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985); Jardel Co. v.
Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987); Graham v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103 (D.C. 1980);
Holley v. Mount Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Ten Associates v. McCutchen, 398 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Smith
v. General Apartment Co., 133 Ga. App. 927, 213 S.E.2d 74 (1975); Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1988); Center Management Corp. v. Bowman,
526 N.E.2d 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393
Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975); Hilligoss v. Cross Co., 228 N.W.2d 585 (Minn.
1975); Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); Trentacost v. Brussel,
82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980); Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C.
636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981); Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507, 407 N.E.2d
451 (1980); Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975); Knapp v. Wilson, 535
S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976); Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 207 S.E.2d
841 (1974).
46. For a practical discussion of the application of the foreseeability rule to future projects, see Henszey, What is the Landlord's Responsibility for Criminal Acts
Committed on the Premises 6 REAL EST. L.J. 104 (1977).
47. There is a major problem with a rule that imposes a duty strictly through
foreseeability of harm. Duty is a matter for the court. See, e.g., Fancil v. Q.S.E.
Foods, 60 Ill. 2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975) (police officer shot by burglar in grocery
store). Yet, foreseeability is a matter for the trier of fact. See, e.g., Graham v. M & J
Corp., 424 A.2d 103 (D.C. 1980) (arsonist set fire in unlocked foyer). Thus, theoretically, a judge must dismiss a case unless there is a duty, but there is no duty unless a
jury finds that the particular injury was foreseeable. The practical result is that in a
case where a plaintiff alleges duty based on foreseeability, the court is precluded from
summary judgment unless the probability of harm is either so great, or so minute
that, as a matter of law, reasonable men may not differ. This result fosters nuisance
suits because plaintiffs are virtually assured of being able to force landlords into incurring trial expenses, or a settlement in lieu of a trial.
48. The seminal case on a foreseeability-based duty is Kline v' 1500 Mass. Ave.
Apartment Corp., where the plaintiff was assaulted and robbed in the common hallway of her apartment building. Kline, 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Prior to this
attack, the defendant landlord had been aware of a series of attacks on the tenants.
Id. at 479 n.2. Before this case, the general rule was that a landlord did not have a
duty to protect another from a criminal act by a third person. Id. at 481. The reasons
for this rule were:
judicial reluctance to tamper with the traditional common law concept of the
landlord-tenant relationship; the notion that the act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of the harm to another resulting therefrom; the oftentimes difficult problem of determining foreseeability of criminal acts; the vagueness of the standard which the landlord
must meet; the economic consequences of the imposition of the duty; and con-
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tend that general duty to Illinois4 s landlords."
The Rowe court then considered whether a landlord can assume
a duty to protect against the criminal acts of third parties by providing lighting, locks and keys,"' or by investigating reports of intruders.2 The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts"3 and
flict with the public policy allocating the duty of protecting citizens from criminal acts to the government rather than the private sector.
Id. at 481. The court decided that the reasons for this general rule did not apply to
modern day urban living conditions or the contract-like relationship of modern leases.
Id. The court held that where the risk of harm is foreseeable and the landlord is the
only one in the position to prevent the harm, the landlord has the duty to do so. Id.
49. Several jurisdictions do not currently follow any rule adopting duty through
foreseeability. See, e.g., King v. Ilikai Properties, Inc., 2 Haw. App. 359, 632 P.2d 657
(1981); Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976).
50. Rowe v. Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 217, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1364
(1988). The court did not specify why it declined to extend the foreseeability rule to
Illinois landlords, but it did cite several sources for support. Id. The court referred to
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS which states that duty rests upon foreseeability and
preventability. Rowe, at 216, 531 N.E.2d at 1364 W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 43 (5th ed. 1984)). In Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984), the
court said that duty rests upon foreseeability, an act voluntarily but carelessly undertaken, and reliance. In Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 207 S.E.2d 841
(1974), the court required that the landlord know, or should know, of the danger
before it would impose a duty. In Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (Md.
App. 1976), the court combined the know or should know standard with the availability of reasonable measures to prevent the danger. The principle drawn from these
sources is that foreseeability alone is insufficient.
51. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 217, 531 N.E.2d at 1364. A number of jurisdictions have
imposed a duty upon landlords to protect tenants when the landlords provide locks or
keys. See, e.g., Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173 (D.C. 1977); Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So.
2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Smith v. General Apartment Co., 133 Ga. App.
927, 213 S.E.2d 74 (1975); Brichacek v. Hiskey, 401 N.W.2d 44 (Iowa 1987); Center
Management Corp. v. Bowman, 526 N.E.2d 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Kraaz v. La
Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 410 So. 2d 1048 (La. 1982); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich.
569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972); Hilligoss v. Cross Co., 304 Minn. 546, 228 N.W.2d 585
(1975); Jacobs v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 121 Misc. 2d 910, 469 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1983);
Shepard v. Drucker & Falk, 63 N.C. App. 667, 306 S.E.2d 199 (1983); Reider v. Martin, 359 Pa. Super. 586, 519 A.2d 507 (1987); Knapp v. Wilson, 535 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1976).
52. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 217, 531 N.E.2d at 1364. American courts have looked to
a variety of circumstances in creating a duty upon landlords to protect tenants from
crime. See, e.g., Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969) (failed to replace
manager, call police, provide lock on door and prevent loitering of unsavory people);
Smith v. General Apartment Co., 133 Ga. App. 927, 213 S.E.2d 74 (1975) (intruder
gained entrance using passkey); Phillips v. Chicago Housing Auth., 89 Ill. 2d 122, 431
N.E.2d 1038 (1982) (duty based on providing inneffective security program); Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App. 3d 88, 497 N.E.2d 433 (1st Dist. 1986) (failed to provide
locks on windows or secure a ladder which provided means of entry), appeal denied,
113 Ill. 2d 571, 505 N.E.2d 352 (1986); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d
409 (1972) (failing to maintain adequate locks or lights); Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa.
383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984) (failing to maintain a specific level of security). But see
Pippin v. Chicago Housing Auth., 78 Ill. 2d 204, 399 N.E.2d 596 (1979) (duty to provide security program did not extend to liability for crimes to tenants); Gant v. FlintGoodgridge Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 359 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 1978), appeal denied,
362 So. 2d 581 (1978) (no liability for decreasing security).
53. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §324A which states:
[o]ne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
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several prior decisions54 in upholding the rule that a landlord is liable for the criminal acts of third parties when the landlord voluntarily provides security measures,55 but does so negligently. The principle found in the Restatement is that such actions induce a tenant
to forgo other remedies or precautions against the risk."6 Applying
this principle, the court found that Paramount did not assume" the
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm,
or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third
person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person
upon the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324(A) (1965).
54. See Phillips v. Chicago Housing Auth., 89 I1. 2d 122, 431 N.E.2d 1038
(1982) (liability related to landlord's failure to close off vacant floors of building);
Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, 82 Ill. 2d 213, 412 N.E.2d 472 (1980) (landlord
increased danger when hired guard service only part time); Pippin v. Chicago Housing Auth. 78 Ill. 2d 204, 399 N.E.2d 596 (1979) (landlord's duty limited to choosing
adequate security company).
For other cases discussing a landlord's liability, see Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc.,
60 Ill. 2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975) (landlord not liable for dark areas inside building not generally open to public); Berry v. The Habitat Co., 152 I1. App. 3d 78, 504
N.E.2d 153 (1st Dist. 1987) (landlord liable when has control of area), appeal denied,
125 111.2d 535, 511 N.E.2d 425 (1987); Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App. 3d 88, 497
N.E.2d 433 (1st Dist. 1986) (landlord liable when acts contributed to danger), appeal
denied, 113 II. 2d 571, 505 N.E.2d 352 (1986); Morgan v. Dalton Management Co.,
117 111.App. 3d 815, 454 N.E.2d 57 (1st Dist. 1983) (no liablility for injury caused by
criminal attack in common area); Carrigan v. New World Enterprises, Ltd., 112 Ill.
App. 3d 970, 446 N.E.2d 265 (3d Dist. 1983) (landlord liable only for inoperable burglar alarm, not for rape); Taylor v. Hocker, 101 Ill. App. 3d 639, 428 N.E.2d 662 (5th
Dist. 1981) (past, nonviolent crime does not make violent crime foreseeable); Kraustrunk v. Chicago Housing Auth., 95 Ill. App. 3d 529, 420 N.E.2d 429 (1st Dist. 1981)
(act did not increase risk of harm to victim); Martin v. Usher, 55 I1. App. 3d 409, 371
N.E.2d 69 (1st Dist. 1977) (no duty to maintain security devices); Stribling v. Chicago
Housing Auth., 34 Ill. App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d 47 (1st Dist. 1975) (duty to guard
against recurring burglaries); Trice v. Chicago Housing Auth., 14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 302
N.E.2d 207 (1st Dist. 1973) (landlord not liable for injury caused by item dropped
over railing).
55. However, a court will not recognize all matters that have an impact upon
security as being security matters. See, e.g., Rowe, 125 11. 2d at 222, 531 N.E.2d 1367
(lights).
56. Id. at 219, 531 N.E.2d at 1365.
57. The court referred to an exculpatory clause in the lease as evidence that the
landlord did not voluntarily assume a duty to protect the tenant. Id. at 219-20, 531
N.E.2d at 1366. An exculpatory clause is an express term in a contract excusing a
party from liability. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 508 (5th ed. 1979). While most
jurisdictions uphold the validity of these clauses, the clauses are interpreted strictly.
J. PAGE, supra note 40, at §9.31. See also Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 112 Ill. 2d 378, 493 N.E.2d 1022 (1986) (clause did not cover third-party action
relating to spread of fire). The clauses are invalid where the landlord's conduct is
wilful or wanton. See, e.g., Smith v. General Apartment Co., 133 Ga. App. 927, 213
S.E.2d 74 (1975) (tenant raped in her apartment by intruder who gained entry by
using passkey). In Illinois, exculpatory clauses as part of a lease of real property are
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responsibility of protecting its tenants by maintaining the door locks
and key system or investigating a report of an intruder. The court
also noted that even if Paramount had assumed a duty, its duty was

limited to the extent of its undertaking:"8 maintaining the locks"9

and keys"0 and investigating the report of an intruder. The court

found that Paramount had not performed these tasks negligently."
The court decided the case by holding that a landlord's aware-

ness of a risk will create a duty to guard against it if the landlord is
the only party in a position to do so.6 2 The risk that the court found
in this case was the risk of illegal entry resulting from unauthorized
possession of master keys."3 Since this landlord made no effort to
reduce the risk of which he had actual knowledge, the court found

that the landlord breached his duty. 4
Finally, the court decided that while generally a negligent person is released from liability when the harm is caused by a superseding intervening cause, such as the intentional criminal act of a third
void as against public policy and unenforceable. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, 1 91 (1987).
58. E.g., Pippin v. Chicago Housing Auth., 78 Ill. 2d 204, 210, 399 N.E.2d 596,
599 (1979) (landlord liable for hiring security guards but not for injuries to a visitor
stabbed by tenant in presence of security guard). In Rowe, the court said that there
was no evidence that Paramount maintained the locks or keys negligently, but that
the evidence indicated that the former owner had been negligent in key control.
Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 221, 531 N.E.2d at 1366-67.
59. The court doubted that either party had control over the door locks, and
that even if Paramount had control over the door locks, "the record shows that the
door locks to J-Mar's offices were functioning properly on the night of the assault."
Id. This is not correct. "Functioning" is the proper action and nature of a thing.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 605-06 (5th ed. 1979). No party argued that the lock was
not operational. The function of a lock on a door is to keep out intruders. Whether
the lock was effective at keeping out an intruder was one of the questions at the base
of this lawsuit.
Additionally, the Rowe court misapplied the principle by holding that the tenant
and landlord shared control over the locks. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 221, 531 N.E.2d at
1366. The lease prohibited the tenant from acting unilaterally. Id. The tenant must
have first obtained the landlord's written permission to affect the office security, and
the landlord had the power to refuse to grant written permission. Brief for Appellant
at appendix p. 20 , Rowe v. Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358
(1988) (No. 65167). Control is the power to manage, direct, restrict or regulate.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 298 (5th ed. 1979). The landlord had the power to manage,
direct, restrict or regulate, but the tenant had no such power. This cannot be considered joint control. A party that does not have control over something has no authority
over it; therefore, the party has no ability to change or modify it. The law will not
impose liability upon one who has no ability to affect the liability. Rowe, 125 IIl. 2d at
215, 531 N.E.2d at 1364.
60. The court found that even though Paramount had retained exclusive control over the keys, there was no evidence that it did not use reasonable care in maintaining them. Id. at 223, 531 N.E.2d at 1367.
61. Id.
62. The court required the landlord to take reasonable precautions, including
warning the tenants of the danger. Id. at 223, 531 N.E.2d at 1368.
63. Id. at 221-22, 531 N.E.2d at 1367.
64. Id. at 227, 531 N.E.2d at 1369.
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party,6" an exception exists when the criminal act is foreseeable. Applying this principle to the case at bar, the court found that it was
foreseeable that an intruder in possession of a master key would
commit a crime." The court reasoned that it is foreseeable that persons committing a crime using a master key will be caught in the
act; 7 that people caught in the act of crime may resort to violence;
and, if a criminal resorts to violence, death may result.6 " Using this
reasoning," the court concluded that Ms. Serpico's murder was a
foreseeable result of Paramount's negligence. Consequently, the intentional criminal act of Free did not release Paramount from
70
liability.
The Rowe court justifiably concluded that a landlord could be
liable for the shooting of the tenant's employees. 7' Although the result was correct, the court's decision was flawed for three reasons.
First, by improperly focusing on the foreseeability of a particular
crime, the court needlessly muddled the issue of whether a landlord
is liable for the resulting harm. Second, by requiring actual knowledge of foreseeable harm, 71 the decision will lead to an overall de65. See, e.g., W.

KEETON, supra note 3, at 313.
66. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 226, 531 N.E.2d at 1369.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 78-80 (discussion of stacking inferences
and foreseeability).
68. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 227, 531 N.E.2d at 1369. The North Eastern Reporter
does not contain a quote and citation to which the official reporter referred. See id.
The quote is, "[It is well within the realm of reason to foresee a situation in which
catching or witnessing a vandal or a burglar in the act, could lead to violence against
that witness/resident." See id., citing, Olar v. Schroit, 202 Cal. Rptr. 457, 155 Cal.
App. 3d 861 (1984).
69. The court's reasoning requires that each step is a virtual certainty. It is very
doubtful that each of these steps can be considered near certain. As each step becomes less certain, the ultimate result becomes increasingly less likely. For example,
for illustrative purposes only, assume that statistically 75% of people with an unauthorized master key will use that key to commit a burglary; 75% of burglars that use
a master key are caught in the act; 75% of these burglars caught in the act resort to
violence; and that in 75% of these cases of violence, someone is killed. The possibility
of death would be 31%. While this is sufficient to create a duty in other contexts,
31% does not constitute probability, which is the synonym for foreseeability in this
context. See Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974) (the occurence
must be "reasonably foreseeable," not "simply foreseeable"). However, applying a
mathematical method of analysis to a legal problem is inherently dangerous. See
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 1329 (1971).
70. See Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 228, 531 N.E.2d at 1369.
71. Id.
72. A significant part of the court's holding was that where a landlord knows of
a risk, a duty exists. Id. at 223, 531 N.E.2d at 1367-68. This signifies a subjective
knowledge requirement; however, the other parts of the decision could mean that the
court did not intend that result. The risk that the court contemplated was the risk of
a murder, not the risk of a crime. See id. The landlord was shown to be aware of the
risk of a crime, but he was not shown to have been aware of the risk of a murder. Id.
Additionally, the court cites cases for support that have applied a "know or should
know" standard for knowledge. Id. Thus, the court may have intended to hold that
the knowledge factor is an objective standard: would the risk have been foreseeable to
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cline in the safety of tenants. Finally, the court did not give adequate consideration" to the relationship between the parties being a
"special relationship 7' 4 and, therefore, an exception to the no-general-duty rule.
First, the Rowe decision is inadequate because it needlessly
muddles foreseeability. The court used foreseeability in a way that
changes its meaning from probability to mere possibility. The court
also used foreseeability for two separate arguments, where, for both
the arguments to have meaning, the word must have a different
meaning for each argument. Yet, it is not clear that the court intended two different meanings, or if it did, what those meanings are.
An event is foreseeable if a reasonable person, looking forward
in time, can reasonably conclude that the event will probably occur.75 Generally, a party has no duty to prevent a harm if that harm
is not foreseeable.7 ' Additionally, even if a harm was foreseeable, if
an unforeseeable source causes the actual harm, such as an intentional criminal act of a third party, that unforeseeable source is a
superseding intervening cause and eliminates the liability of a previously negligent act.77
The court used the forseeability of the attack to create a duty
to prevent the attack. To conclude that the attack was foreseeable"
the court linked several inferences 9 together, thereby attenuating
the certainty of each inference.6 0 This reasoning changed the standard for foreseeability from whether the crimes will probably occur
to simply whether such a crime is possible. This is a radical depara reasonable person in the position of the landlord? This interpretation would go far
in alleviating the harshness of the decision because the disincentive would be eliminated. However, since there is still no obligation to become aware of foreseeable risks,
landlords can limit their liability simply by avoiding situations where they would be
expected to learn of foreseeable risks. A better rule would consider the foreseeability
of the risk to a reasonable landlord. This is analagous to the position of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, which states, in other contexts, a landlord may be liable
"for conditions of which he is aware, or of which he could have known in the exercise
of reasonable care." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §17.6 comment c (1977).

See also Lesar, Tort Liability of Illinois Landlords for Crimes of Third Parties,1983
S. ILL. L. REV. 415, 432 (trends in Illinois landlord-tenant law).
73. The court simply looked at the landlord and tenant relationship as a class
and noted that this relationship has never been considered a "special relationship."
See Rowe, 125 Ill.
2d at 215-16, 531 N.E.2d at 1364. For a discussion of what constitutes a "special relationship," see infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
74. See Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 216, 531 N.E.2d at 1364.
75. W. KEETON, supra note 3, at §31.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §302 (1965).
77. W. KEETON, supra note 3, at §44.
78. Determining foreseeability is a matter for the trier of fact. See, e.g., Graham
v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103, 105 (D.C. 1980).
79. See supra note 68 and accompanying text for the inferences that the court
used.
80. Rowe v. Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 227, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1369
(1988).
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ture from the current law because in all other respects forseeability
requires probability, not merely possibility."'
The court also used the foreseeability of the attack to declare
that the attack itself was not a superseding cause which would eliminate liability.2 If foreseeability has the same meaning for both arguments, it would be impossible for the criminal act to be foreseeable
in forming a duty, and yet simultaneously unforeseeable, thereby
becoming a superseding cause which cuts off liability. Thus, if the
meaning of foreseeability does not change, one of the court's arguments was superfluous. For the entire decision to have meaning, the
court must have intended foreseeability to mean different things for
each argument; yet, the court did not specify that the word should
have different meanings in each context. Moreover, if the court did
intend that foreseeability should have different meanings in each
context, it is unclear from the opinion what those meanings are.
To impose a duty, the court should have applied the rule that a
crime is foreseeable based upon the totality of the circumstances."3
By focusing on what a lock is intended to do, the court would have
avoided the foreseeability problem. The purpose of a lock is to prevent crimes against people and property. If a lock is ineffective, a
81. By requiring that the crime be foreseeable, the courts are requiring that the
crime be probable, and not just possible. E.g., Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 308
N.E.2d 617 (1974) (unforeseeable that car accident victim would land on drain pipe
on parkway). This line between possible and probable has been very difficult to define. Henszey & Weisman, What is the Landlord's Responsibility for Criminal Acts
Committed on the Premises? 6 REAL EST. L.J. 104, 113 (1977).
82. See supra note 3 for a discussion of superseding cause.
83. See, e.g., Samson v. Saginaw Professional Building, Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224
N.W.2d 843 (1975) (landlord liable for attack of mental patient when landlord leased
office space to state mental clinic).
Some courts, however, use the "prior similars" rule, which requires that the
plaintiff show that the landlord knew, or should have known of the occurrence of the
same crime on the premises, before the injury in question. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Erie
Investment Co., 138 N.J. Super. 93, 350 A.2d 268 (App. Div. 1975) (burglary was
foreseeable, shooting was not). Initially, the "prior similars" rule had wide acceptance; however, higher courts in many jurisdictions have modified it. Many courts
have applied a modified rule in which evidence of prior similar crime is not necessary,
but that evidence of some prior criminal activity is used. See, e.g., Isaacs v. Huntington Mem. Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985) (doctor shot
in hospital parking lot); Jardel Co. Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987) (employee of tenant abducted from parking lot and raped); Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d
1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (landlords' actual or constructive knowledge of prior
similar criminal acts committed on the premises not required); Galloway v. Bankers
Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1988) (crimes in general were similar acts for purposes of showing foreseeability of homosexual rape in restroom); Scott v. Watson, 278
Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976) (general criminal activity in apartment complex common areas); Advance Rental Centers, Inc. v. Brown, 729 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) (landlord not liable for leaving window open unless knew of prior criminal activity); Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507, 407 N.E.2d 451 (1980) (criminal activities of third persons in office building and lobby could lead to foreseeable
risk of harm); Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., 274 Pa. Super. 427, 418 A.2d 480 (1980) (no
need to be aware of exact type of criminal act that might occur).
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crime is the likely result. If a crime is the likely result, the fact that
the perpetrator is a third party is irrelevant.8 4 When a landlord's
duty is breached, the landlord is liable for the likely result; in this
case the result was a violent attack.
The more serious problem with this decision is that the court's
actual knowledge requirement threatens the general safety of tenants. All of the jurisdictions currently imposing a duty based upon
any form of forseeability use a "knew or should have known" stan-

dard."' Like Illinois, several jurisdictions initially adopted an actual
knowledge requirement, but in each case the higher courts modified

the requirement to include the "should have known" standard. Part
of the Rowe court's decision limits the duty to actual knowledge of

danger. This court did not include the "knew or should have
known" standard.
Absent a "knew or should have known" standard, if an Illinois
landlord learns of a danger, the law imposes a duty. 8 If he does
nothing, he is in breach of this duty and is liable for the result. If he
takes action, he runs the risk of the court considering his action inadequate.8 7 If a landlord takes all the steps necessary to insure that
the courts will not consider his action inadequate, he may incur a

substantial burden.
84. See

Compared to the landlord that never actually

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §302B (1965).
85. Compare Advance Rental Centers, Inc. v. Brown, 729 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) (duty requires knowledge of criminal activity) with Aaron v. Havens, 758
S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1988) (duty present because landlord knew or should have known of
dangerous condition).
86. In Rowe, the danger came from the loose key control of the prior owner.
Rowe v. Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 227, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1369 (1988). The
landlord knew of the danger and did nothing, thus the danger became reality. If the
landlord had never learned of the danger, he still would not have done anything because there would have been no reason to act and the danger would also have become
reality.
87. The duty is to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. Id. If reasonable
steps are not taken, the duty is breached. Id.. However, the landlord can also be in
breach under the theory that he undertook to perform an act and did so negligently.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §324 (1965). These are alternate theories,
thereby giving plaintiffs additional opportunities to prevail.
88. A landlord is required to take reasonable precautions against the foreseeable
harm. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 224, 531 N.E.2d at 1368. The difficulty is in defining "reasonable" as it applies to a particular instance. Even judges are not expected to be
able to do this, which is why foreseeability is a jury question. See W. KEETON, supra
note 3, § 31. Our system defines reasonable as whatever a jury decides, which means
that reasonable men may differ. Id. at Sec. 32. If reasonable men may differ, reasonable landlords will take precautions they deem adequate, which a jury may later decide
were not adequate. The only way a landlord can truly protect himself is to take such
extreme precautions that a judge may determine, as a matter of law, that reasonable
men may not differ. See Graham v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103, 107 (D.C. 1980). This
point is more difficult for an individual landlord to find than defining what "reasonable" is in that instance. See, e.g., Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409
(1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (tenant attacked in vestibule of apartment building).
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learned of a risk,"9 the landlord making the conscientious effort to
reduce the risk is in a far worse position90 because he incurs a burden and potential liability, while his counterpart incurs 'neither.
The net effect of the Rowe court's decision will discourage landlords from looking for unsafe conditions, from making improvements to increase safety, and from being accessable to tenant reports of unsafe conditions. Landlords will have a strong disincentive
to look 9 ' for problems if they are only liable when they find
problems.9 2 Similarly, making improvements to a dangerous condition constitutes recognition that a dangerous condition existed, s
thus inviting liability. The landlord then becomes liable if the improvements are insufficient. Additionally, since landlords can only
assume a duty by actually being aware of a problem, landlords may
discourage tenants from reporting unsafe conditions.9 ' Thus, since
89. The landlord that never learned of the risk will not be held liable for not
taking action to prevent it. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussion of
actual knowledge requirement). Nor will this landlord incur expense or
inconvenience.
90. It is possible that a landlord who is held to a stricter standard will benefit
through an increased value of his property. This will result in higher rental income.
However, this result is far from certain.
91. Many landlords regularly inspect their property. Their inspections serve
many purposes: they look for unsafe conditions in order to prevent injury or potential
liability; they look for damage so that it can be repaired and reimbursed promptly;
and they look for ways to improve the property and make it more valuable.
92. The disincentive applies when a problem is never effectively reported to the
landlord, or the harm occurs before it is effectively reported. If it is reported, the
disincentive is eliminated.
93. Cf. FED. R. EvID. 407. That rule states:
[w]hen, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with
the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of sebsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Id. This rule was enacted to allow landowners to repair harmful conditions, without
thereby incurring liability, because the social policy of preventing harm is greater
than the social policy of assigning fault. See Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting
Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 574, 590-91 (1956). The rule cannot be applied to
this instance because the rule is only concerned with repairs which occurred after the
harm occurred. See FED. R. EvID. 407. Here the repair would be made before the
event occurred.
94. Discouragement might come in many forms. At one extreme the landlord
can make himself virtually unavailable. For example, the landlord could arrange for
rent to be paid into a bank account, or to be paid in a lump sum. At the other extreme landlords might evict tenants that make complaints, even though this practice,
known as retaliatory eviction, is probably illegal. See, e.g., Seidelman v. Kouvavus, 57
Ill. App. 3d 350, 373 N.E.2d 53 (1978) (tenant evicted for circulating a petition to
rescind landlord's rules); Sheppard v. Drucker & Falk, 63 N.C. App. 667, 306 S.E.2d
199 (1983) (exclusion of testimony regarding landlord's reaction to report of crimes
not reversable error). See also Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297
(1970) (action for retaliatory eviction allowed if landlord knew that tenant accurately
reported a violation of the housing code and such knowledge was the sole purpose of
the eviction).
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the law will not impute knowledge to the landlord through the
"should have known standard", one element"5 of finding a duty requires that the landlord actually know of the danger. If the landlord
never learns of the danger, it will not be prevented and will most
likely occur. Consequently, the effect of the Rowe decision is to discourage preventable dangers from being prevented, leading to needless injuries.
Finally, the Rowe court incorrectly disregarded the applicability
of the "special relationship" exception in this case. When a special
relationship exists, the general no duty rule does not apply, and a
party has the duty to take reasonable precautions against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties."' The common thread running
through the special relationships9 7 is that one party relinquishes
part of his autonomy, 8 or his ability to control his environment, 9 in
00
favor of a dominant party.
95. The court's requirement for establishing a duty consists of two parts: knowledge of foreseeable harm and being the only party in a position to prevent it. Rowe v.
Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 223, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1368 (1988). Only the
landlord could change the locks on the complex, or warn tenants of the possibility of
outstanding master keys. Id. This holding is unfortunate because it ignores the liklihood of drastic imbalances between the parties. A better rule would consider the
economic and social relationships between the parties and require a landlord to act
when he is in a better position to do so. If preventing a particular harm would be
highly inconvenient or expensive for the tenant, but not for the landlord, the duty
should rest upon the landlord.
96. See, e.g., W. KEETON, supra note 3, at 202 (discussion of foreseeability).
97. The most common examples of the special relationship exception cases are:
carrier and passenger; innkeeper and guest; and, business and business invitee. Id.
But see Meadows v. Friedman R.R. Salvage Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. App.
1983) (no special relationship between business and invitee). However, the courts
have been expanding the application of the exception. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (landlord and tenant); Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696 (1958) (insurer and insured); Parness v. City of Tempe, 123 Ariz. 460, 600 P.2d 764 (1979) (city
and park patron); Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 154
N.E.2d 534 (1958) (police and informant); Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa, 279 Pa.
Super. 382, 421 A.2d 251 (1980) (employer and employee); Mcleod v. Grant County
School Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953) (school and student).
98. As used here, "autonomy" means the ability to decide for oneself how to
act. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 92 (1982). No individual is truly autonomous; society imposes certain constraints on everyone. The choices that a person is
entitled to make, within the law, denote his degree of autonomy. If a part of this
autonomy is relinquished to another, a special relationship exists.
99. The ability to control one's environment is the authority to regulate one's
surroundings. This includes many factors, such as lighting, sound, climate and other
people. For example, a hotel patron has no authority to regulate who else may occupy
the building, or even an adjacent room; yet a farmer leasing a farm may force others
to maintain a great distance from the farmhouse. This is distinguished from autonomy because autonomous things usually concern only oneself, while the ability to
control one's environment includes the potential for regulating the conduct of other
people.
100. If the parties ability to reduce the risk is equal, there is little justification
for shifting the responsibility to one who will not otherwise be affected.
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Historically, this principle did not apply to a typical landlordtenant relationship.'01 In pre-industrial age leases, 102 tenants did not
usually relinquish their autonomy, or their ability to control their
surroundings. 10 A typical tenant had full control over the land, including his own actions on the land. Thus, these relationships were
properly excluded from the special relationships.
Changes in society have caused modern leases to differ from
those in the past. 104 The hotel and guest relationship was one of the
first to be considered special, yet in some instances modern leases
are more restrictive upon the tenants than if the tenants were guests
in a hotel. 05 Courts extended the special relationship to hotels'0 6
because the reasons for the rule were present; guests had no autonomy or ability to control their surroundings. Likewise, the exception
should be applied to those modern leases where the reasons for the
rule exist, such as when the tenant gives up his autonomy' 0 7 or his
ability to control his surroundings,'
in favor of the dominant
landlord.
Applying this ruie to the facts in Rowe, when the tenant signed
the lease the tenant relinquished to the landlord exclusive control
over the keys to the office,'0 9 control" over the building's security
devices,"' and control over the areas outside the office." 2 According
101. In a typical lease of the 1700's, the occupant was probably just as capable
of repairing things that needed repaired as the landlord. See C. MOYNIHAN, supra
note 33, at 78 (history of property leases). Additionally, tenants were in a far better
position to safeguard the property. See id. The tenants were usually on the scene,
while the landlords usually were not. Id.
102. For a discussion of the historical basis of leases, see id.
103. For a discussion of the changes in leases over the years, see McGovern,
The Historical Conception of a Lease For Years, 23 UCLA L. REV. 501 (1976).
104. E.g., Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980) (tenant
mugged in stairwell of apartment building).
105. A lease is very much like a contract. See Hicks, The ContractualNature of
Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443 (1972). As such, the parties can insert
almost any provisions they choose. Since the parties to a contract often have unequal
bargaining positions, terms are included that are restrictive upon the weaker party. In
a lease, such terms can include, for example, restrictions on: use of the premises,
guests, and noise.
106. See, e.g., Fortney v. Hotel Hancroft, 5 Ill. App. 2d 327, 125 N.E.2d 544
(1955) (hotel required to explain how attacker gained entry into victim's room).
107. See supra note 98 for a discussion of autonomy.
108. See supra note 99 for a discussion on the ability to control one's
environment.
109. Brief for Appellant at Appendix 20, Rowe v. Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill.
2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988) (No.65167).
110. See supra note 59 for a discussion of the control over an item.
111. Brief for Appellant at Appendix 20, Rowe v. Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill.
2d 203, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988) (No.65167).
112. J-Mar's office was in one building of an eight building complex. Rowe v.
Lombard State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 208, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1360 (1988). As such, JMar had no authority over the areas adjacent to the office which were not within the
leased area. See id. These areas were under the control of the landlord who allowed
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to the rationale behind the rule, these factors are sufficient to create
the existence of a special relationship. Because the special relationship exception applies, Paramount had the duty to use reasonable
care to prevent the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties. Paramount breached this duty when it took no action, and it is therefore
liable for the injuries proximately caused by the breach of its duty:
the shooting of Lori Rowe and Bonnie Serpico.
In conclusion, the Rowe court's decision properly found this
landlord liable, but its precedential value will be limited to the particular facts. Illinois attorneys must now litigate a foreseeability issue in order for the court to clarify itself. Additionally, Illinois plaintiffs must now prove that the landlord was actually aware 13 of the
risk of the particular harm. This result is regressive and violates the
public policy of encouraging safety" 4 because it discourages landlords from correcting unsafe conditions. The court should have
noted the change in society since the inception of the special relationship exception, and recognized that modern leases are different
from their historical counterparts. The court would then have expanded the special relationship to those landlord and tenant relationships"" that merit" 6 its application. Thus, while Rowe provides
all of the tenants to use them. See id. This is markedly different from the lease of a
farm and farmhouse where the farm tenant has the authority to prevent people from
entering the property, let alone approaching the house. In the business office instance
a tenant generally has no authority over someone standing within arms reach of the
office door, regardless of that person's intent.
113. For a discussion of the requirement that duty requires actual knowledge of
a foreseeable harm, see supra notes 85 - 89 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 91 - 96 and accompanying notes for a discussion of the
inherent danger in discouraging repairs.
115. Some commentators would have the courts make a distinction between
commercial and residential landlord and tenant relationships. See, e.g., Annotation,
Landlord's Obligation to Protect Tenants Against Criminal Activities of Third Parties, 43 A.L.R. 3d 331, 363 (1972). This article states:
For example, an argument may be made that a landlord of residential property
owes a greater duty to his tenants than does a landlord of business property to
provide security against criminal acts. It may be argued, for instance, that
crimes against business tenants ordinarily are directed against property, and
may be adequately insured against, the cost of such insurance being treated as
a cost of doing business, while offenses involving residential property often are
directed against the person and involve losses not easily remediable; that a
residential landlord is better able to control access to his property than is a
landlord of property generally open to the public; and that the analogy to the
innkeeper-guest relationship, supporting recovery in some recent cases, is more
clearly applicable to residential than to business leases.
Id. at 339 (footnote omitted). Such a broad characterization is as misplaced as the
exclusion of all landlord and tenant relationships from the special relationship exception. The correct approach would be to examine the specific relationship in light of all
the factors, including the type of the lease, but not exclusively whether it is commercial or residential. See Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224
N.W.2d 843 (1975). But see Royal Neckwear Co., Inc., v. Century City, Inc., 205 Cal.
App. 3d 1146, 252 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1988); Richmond Medical Supply Co., Inc. v. Clifton, 235 Va. 584, 369 S.E.2d 407 (1988).
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Illinois tenants with the key, it is certainly not a master key, and
now plaintiff attorneys must search for the door that the key
unlocks.
Jeffrey Fowler

116. There are a number of factors that courts should consider in deciding
whether a special relationship exists. See Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir 1970) (control over the property, whether only
one party in a relationship has the ability to perform the necessary acts); Isaacs v.
Huntington Mei. Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985)
(foreseeability and certainty of harm, the morality of inaction, the consequences of
imposing the relationship, the insurability of the risk); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975) (a relationship between the
parties which society views as sufficiently strong to require more than mere observation of the events which unfold); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, T 302 (Smith-Hurd 1987) (the

type of lease); J.
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(2d ed. 1988) (social policy);

§324A(c) (1965) (the degree of reliance customary

